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RESTRICTING THE AVAILABILITY OF
FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS: LEHM4N v.
L YCOMING COUNTY CHILDREN'AS
SER VICES
I. INTRODUCTION
On June 30, 1982, the United States Supreme Court ended a six-
year battle by Marjorie Lehman to regain custody of her sons following
the termination of her parental rights by a Pennsylvania court in 1976.
In Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency,I the Court,
for the first time in its history, erected a strict jurisdictional barrier to
federal habeas corpus review of state proceedings that terminate paren-
tal rights.' The decision also quite probably establishes a barrier to
federal habeas review of any state determination regarding placement
of minors.3
The termination of Ms. Lehman's parental rights to her three sons
by the Lycoming County orphan's court4 forms the basis of the Leh-
man case. However, this Note will not attempt to discern whether the
termination was just. It remains important, however, to realize that the
Lehman case arises in a factual setting naturally fraught with emo-
tional and philosophical perils. These are dangers of which a court-
particularly one of absolute finality-must beware when it accepts the
responsibility of deciding an issue that almost assuredly will cause
repercussions that reach far beyond the immediate disposition of the
suit.
Unavoidably, there are value judgments lurking behind the
Supreme Court's decision in Lehman. Among these is the extent of the
right or duty of'a state to intervene in a family on behalf of the chil-
dren. Closely connected are the questions of what behavior amounts to
good or bad parenting, the degree of poor parenting necessary to war-
1. 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982) (6-3 decision).
2. Since at least 1846, the Court has managed to avoid squarely addressing the issue of
whether parents whose parental rights have been terminated have a right to federal habeas corpus
review of the state termination proceedings. See cases cited infra note 5.
3. See infra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
4. In re William Lehman, Mark Lehman, Frank Lehman, Nos. 2986-88 (Ct. Com. Pleas,
Lycoming County, Pa., June 3, 1976).
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rant state intervention, and the right of a parent to raise her children
without fear that a state agency will determine that she is a substandard
parent, and should be deprived of her children. The Supreme Court's
response to its value system and the facts of the case surely affected its
decision. This is as it should be. Yet the Court seems to have left these
values unexamined in Lehman, and to have hidden the potentially det-
rimental effect of its decision behind the negative aspects of the facts at
hand, as well as behind the states' rights politics of the day.
There are value judgments which underlie this Note. Principal
among these are the following: (1) There is no absolute right or wrong
way to raise a child; (2) The idea of an unchecked government deciding
who will raise children-and how they will be raised-has chilling im-
plications. It is extremely difficult to identify situations which are gen-
uinely appropriate for state intervention to the extent of removing
children from their natural parents' home. One can look to an individ-
ual case and see that a particular parenting technique (e.g., excessive
corporal punishment or emotional "abuse") has had a negative effect
on a child. Yet the same behavior might have a completely different
effect on a different child. Thus, because no absolutes exist, it seems
very unwise to extinguish any method of correcting a state when it
oversteps its bounds. By focusing too strongly on the individual facts
before it in Lehman, the Supreme Court has unnecessarily foreclosed a
procedure, federal habeas corpus, which might be entirely appropriate
under other factual circumstances. The Lehman opinion is too brief,
and too loosely reasoned, to undertake to decide an issue which the
Court has avoided since at least 1846.1
After a brief general discussion of the facts of the case and the
history and function of the writ of habeas corpus, this Note will attempt
to deal with the Court's opinion in light of the Lehman facts and the
historical backdrop of the habeas issue. Finally, the probable impact of
the holding, in light of other avenues of federal review of state proceed-
ings to terminate parental rights, will be explored.
5. See Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 327 (1846) (habeas corpus, sought by father who
was attempting to gain custody of his daughter from his estranged wife, denied on grounds that
the matter in dispute did not exceed $2,000, thus depriving federal court of "appellate" jurisdic-
tion); see also Matters v. Ryan, 249 U.S. 375 (1919) (denial of habeas corpus to obtain custody of a
child allegedly kidnapped and taken to Canada. The Court explicitly declined to determine
"[w]hether a case might arise where a court of the United States could take jurisdiction of a
petition for habeas corpus upon averment of diversity of citizenship and pecuniary interest, with-
out the assertion of a federal right." Id at 378.)
1983]
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1971, Marjorie Lehman was pregnant, unmarried, unable to ob-
tain day care for her three sons, and recognized that she was unable to
care for them properly.6 She therefore gave custody of the boys, then
aged one through seven years,7 to the Lycoming County Children's
Service Agency, so that her sons could be placed in temporary foster
care.' She maintained contact with the boys9 and three years later
sought to have them returned to her.10 At that time, the agency deter-
mined Ms. Lehman should not regain custody of her sons II and insti-
tuted proceedings to terminate her parental rights so that the boys
could be adopted.2
Ms. Lehman's parental rights to her sons were terminated in 1976
by the Lycoming County Common Pleas Court.' 3 Ms. Lehman ap-
pealed the termination, 4 and it was affirmed by the Pennsylvania
6. The facts of the case are taken primarily from In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, -, 383 A.2d
1228, 1247-48, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978) (concurring and dissenting opinion of Nix, J.),
wherein the majority of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the termination of Ms. Leh-
man's parental rights with respect to her three sons. Id at 1247.
7. Id at 1248 n.2. The boys, Frank, Mark and William, were born in 1963, 1965, and 1969.
The oldest, Frank, was eighteen by the time Lehman was considered by the United States
Supreme Court, so that the habeas issue was inapplicable as to him. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3233.
34, 3234 n.3. The boys' fathers, in earlier state court proceedings, had voluntarily relinquished
parental rights to their sons. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3233 n.l.




12. Id The Supreme Court in Lehman explicitly described the situation as follows:
Although Ms. Lehman visited her sons monthly, she did not request their return
until 1974. At that point, the Lycoming County Children's Services Agency initiated
parental termination proceedings. In those proceedings, the Orphan's Court Division of
the Lycoming County Court of Common Pleas heard testimony from Agency
caseworkers, a psychologist, nutrition aides, petitioner, and the three sons. The judge
concluded that "it is absolutely clear to the court that, by reason of her very limited
social and intellectual development combined with her five-year separation from the
children, the mother is incapable of providing minimal care, control and supervision for
the three children. Her incapacity cannot and will not be remedied."
Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3234 (footnotes and citations omitted). The Court also noted that "[tihere
was no evidence that any of the sons wanted to return to their mother." Id at n.2.
The Court does not explain why it felt compelled to emphasize the factual background of the
case and state proceedings involved, including such a description of the evidence taken in those
proceedings. In view of the Court's blanket holding that the federal habeas corpus statute, 28
U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976), "does not confer jurisdiction on federal courts to consider collateral chal-
lenges to state-court judgments involuntarily terminating parental rights," Id at 3233 (syllabus by
the Court), it would seem that such factual descriptions were irrelevant to the issue at hand.
13. In re William Lehman, Mark Lehman, Frank Lehman, Nos. 2986-88 (Ct. Com. Pleas,
Lycoming County, Pa., June 3, 1976).
14. Appeal of parental rights terminations directly to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is
provided for by 17 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 211-202(3) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982).
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Supreme Court.15 Application for certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court was denied.16 Ms. Lehman then made application, as
next friend in behalf of her sons, to the federal district court for a writ
of habeas corpus, challenging the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania
statute under which her parental rights had been terminated 7 and
seeking a declaration that she was her sons' legal parent. The writ was
denied.18 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit upheld the denial
on the basis that the federal court lacked jurisdiction to issue the writ.' 9
The Supreme Court then granted certiorari.20 Significantly, writers in
each reported decision felt it necessary to comment on their perceptions
of Ms. Lehman's parental capacity.2' In decisions concerning the fed-
15. In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 383 A.2d 1228 (1978).
16. 439 U.S. 880 (1978).
17. The relevant statute is 17 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2511(a) (Purdon Supp. 1981-1982),
which provides in pertinent part:
The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any
of the following grounds: ....
(a) the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent has
caused the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary
for his physical and mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapcity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
1d
18. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, No. 79-65 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1979).
19. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 648 F.2d 135, 146 (3d Cir.
1981) (issue raised did not sufficiently implicate the federal interest in personal liberty to warrant
extension of the writ).
20. 454 U.S. 813 (1981). The federal circuit courts of appeal had split on the issue of whether
federal habeas corpus should be available in such circumstances. In addition to the Third Circuit
in Lehman, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in Sylvander v. Home for Little Wanderers,
584 F.2d 1103 (1978), had held that the writ should not be available. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, had issued a writ of habeas corpus at the request of an indigent
mother after her attempts to protest termination proceedings and thereafter regain custody of her
child, without benefit of counsel, had failed. Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599 (1981). The appellate
court in Davis held that the failure to provide counsel for the mother was a violation of due
process. Id at 602-04. Interestingly, the Supreme Court, two days after handing down its deci-
sion in Lehman. vacated and remanded the Davis grant of habeas corpus in a memorandum opin-
ion, sub nom. Chastain v. Davis, 102 S. Ct. 3504 (1982).
21. For example, the plurality opinion of Judge Garth of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
cited "the deplorable living conditions that obtained in [Ms. Lehman's] apartment." 648 F.2d at
136. Judge Rosenn, dissenting in the same court, noted that when Ms. Lehman originally placed
her sons in the care of the Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, it was done informally
and the parties intended that the custody be only temporary. Id at 156 (Rosenn, J., dissenting).
Judge Rosern also pointed out that later the agency "resisted Ms. Lehman's efforts to obtain the
return of her sons." Id
Ms. Lehman also was described variously as a mother who "by reason of her very limited
social and intellectual development. . . is incapable of providing minimal care, control and su-
pervision for the three children," Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3234 (quoting findings of Lycoming
County Ct. Com. Pleas), and as a mother who had an "ability to appraise the needs of her family
... and to successfully secure effective means to meet [those needs]." In re William L., 447 Pa. at
-, 383 A.2d at 1248 (Nix, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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eral courts' jurisdiction to grant the writ, it seems that these perceptions
are irrelevant to determining the issue.
The Supreme Court broadly defined the sole issue in the case as
"whether federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, under [28 U.S.C.] § 2254,
may be invoked to challenge the constitutionality of a state statute
under which a State has obtained custody of children and terminated
involuntarily the parental rights of their natural parent."22 The Court
affirmed the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction,23 never reaching the mer-
its of the case's constitutional challenge.
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRIT
The Supreme Court once described the federal writ of habeas
corpus as a device "for protecting the individual liberty of persons...
from illegal imprisonment under state authorization. 24 The writ has a
long history,25 and came to America as part of its common law inheri-
tance from England. 26 Habeas corpus is explicitly provided for by the
suspension clause of the Constitution,27 and the dimensions of the fed-
eral writ have been the subject of congressional enactment. 28
Even at common law, however, the writ's use was not restricted to
freeing incarcerated persons. For example, in 1722 it was held that the
writ was available to free a woman from the custody of her guardians
in order to allow her to return to her husband.2 9 By the 19th century it
had been held in England that the writ was available to remove a child
from the control of one parent and give control to the other parent,
22. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3235.
23. Id at 3240.
24. In re Burrns, 136 U.S. 586, 590-91 (1980).
25. For a managably brief review of the history of the writ in England and America, see
Miller and Shepherd, New LooksA4tAnAncient Writ: Habeas Corpus Reexamined, 9 U. RicH. L.
Rav. 49 (1974) (hereinafter cited as Miller & Shepherd). Proceedings parallel to early habeas
corpus actions are known to have taken place in 1199 although the writ was not fully codified in
England until 1679. Id at 50-52. Although the writ originally was used as a means for courts to
force a party's attendance so that a case could be tried, by the early 1600's the writ was being used
as a process by which the legality of the government's detention of an individual could be re-
viewed. Id at 51.
26. Id at 52. Following American independence and until the Constitution was adopted,
"habeas corpus was mentioned in the constitutions of less than half the states, probably because of
the view that the common law writ was so well established as to render a constitutional provision
unnecessary." Id at 52-53.
27. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
28. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2280 (1976). This Note is concerned with 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which
deals with a federal court's grant of habeas corpus to state prisoners.
29. Rex v. Clarkson, I Str. 444, 93 Eng. Rep. 625 (K.B. 1722) (cited in Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 239 n.4 (1962)).
[Vol. 19:118
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despite the lack of government "imprisonment, restraint, or duress of
any kind."30
In the United States, federal habeas corpus also has been available
to test state restrictions of liberty other than incarceration. In 1953, the
United States Supreme Court approved the device to test the exclusion
of resident aliens from this country, even though the individuals in-
volved were free to go anywhere else in the world.3' In a 1962 decision,
Jones v. Cunningham,32 the Court held that a parolee from a state
prison was sufficiently in state custody to warrant federal habeas
corpus. 33 In this connection, the Jones Court stated that "what matters
is that [probationary restraints] significantly restrain petitioner's liberty
to do those things which in this country free men are entitled to do."34
Six years later, in Carafas v. LaValle,35 the Court held that a state pris-
oner, who had finished serving his sentence while action on his federal
habeas corpus petition was pending, was "in custody" of the state, de-
spite his physical freedom, for habeas purposes.36 The Court noted:
"[Carafas] is suffering, and will continue to suffer, serious disabilities
.. .if his claim that he has been illegally convicted is meritorious. 37
Further, in Strait v. Laird,38 a 1972 decision, the Court held that a cur-
rently unattached military officer was "in custody" even though the
only real restraint on his freedom was a requirement of periodic reports
to a superior officer. 39 Finally, in a 1973 opinion, Hensley v. Municipal
Court,4 0 a person convicted under state law but free on his own recog-
30. Earl of Westmeath v. Countess of Westmeath, as set out in a reporter's footnote in Lyons
v. Blenkin, 1 Jac. 245, 264, 37 Eng. Rep. 842, 849 (Ch. 1821) (cited in Jones v. Cunningham, 371
U.S. 236, 239 (1962)).
31. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
32. 371 U.S. 236 (1962).
33. Id. at 239-44.
34. Id at 243. The restraints included making monthly reports to a parole officer, obtaining
the parole officer's permission to leave town or change residence, and being subject to the possibil-
ity of incarceration at any time for cause. Id at 242.
35. 391 U.S. 234 (1968).
36. Id at 242. Carafas overruled the Court's previous holding on this issue in Parker v. Ellis,
362 U.S. 547 (1960). Carafas, 391 U.S. at 240. Chief Justice Warren's dissent in Parker was
specifically adopted by the Carafas majority. Id at 238. However, neither the Carafas majority
nor the Parker dissent seems willing to extend federal habeas corpus to a prisoner who did not file
his application for habeas corpus prior to his unconditional release from prison. In this connec-
tion, the Carafas Court notes that a prisoner's ongoing disabilities would arise "because of the
law's complexities, and not because of his fault." Id. at 239.
37. Carafas, 391 U.S. at 239. These disabilities included ongoing civil penalties, such as dis-
enfranchisement, imposed by the state on convicts. Id at 237.
38. 406 U.S. 341 (1972).
39. Id at 345-46. Strait was attending law school in California. He filed for habeas corpus,
seeking review of the military's denial of his request for conscientious objector status. Id at 342.
40. 411 U.S. 345 (1973).
1983]
6
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 19 [1983], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol19/iss1/5
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19:118
nizance pending execution of his sentence, was considered to be "in
custody" for habeas corpus purposes 1.4
Thus, the Court has tended to broadly construe the "in custody"
requirement of the habeas statute as applied to adults in order to pro-
vide a remedy for individuals whose liberty is wrongfully restricted, or
who are made to suffer disabilities at the hands of a governmental en-
tity. In the criminal setting in particular, federal habeas corpus has
become a method whereby state criminal proceedings can be brought
into line with federal constitutional thought.42 However, the United
States Supreme Court's most recent trend has been to restrict the scope
of federal habeas corpus review of state convictions.4  This apparently
is in deference to states' rights, and is consistent with Chief Justice Bur-
ger's advocacy, of "new federalism."'
It is possible to conceive of the Court's holding in Lehman as a
facet of this recent limitation of habeas corpus in criminal cases. Yet it
appears more accurate to recognize that, unhampered by any previous
Supreme Court ruling allowing federal habeas corpus to a minor in-
41. Id at 351-53. The Lehman majority also cited two state cases in which habeas corpus
was used to test child "custody" (i.e., control). Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3239 (citing Boardman v.
Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A.2d 521 (1948) and In re Swall, 36 Nev. 171, 134 P. 96 (1913)).
Both of the state cases cited by the majority are distinguishable from the Lehman situation, how-
ever, in that each allowed the use of habeas corpus by a child's parent to gain control of the child
from either the natural parent (Boardman) or another relative (Swall). In neither case did state
action lead to the other person's control over the child.
42. Cover and Aleinikoff, Dialetical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J.
1035 (1977). Under Chief Justice Warren, the Court was particularly active in expanding the
range of constitutional protection provided by federal habeas corpus review of state convictions.
Id at 1037-44.
43. This development has prompted a great deal of comment. See, e.g., Michael, 'Wew"
Federalism and the Burger Court's Deference to the States in Federal Habeas Proceedings, 64 IOWA
L. REv. 233 (1979); Comment, Habeas corpus: Still as Great as When it was Writ? 43 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 773 (1979).
An instructive juxtaposition is provided in the field of federal habeas review of state convic-
tions arguably obtained in violation of the exclusionary rule, and thus of the fourth amendment.
In Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969), the Court stated, "'[our decisions leave no
doubt that the federal habeas remedy extends to state prisoners alleging that unconstitutionally
obtained evidence was admitted against them at trial." Id at 225. In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S.
465 (1976), the Court held, "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair fitiga-
tion of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas relief on
the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his
trial." Id at 494 (footnotes omitted).
44. "The net effect of the Burger Court decisions has been to limit the accessability of federal
habeas corpus to prisoners convicted in state courts." Miller & Shepherd, supra note 25, at 70. In
1952, Justice Jackson may have described a central motivation for the current restriction of habeas
corpus, when he wrote of the "progressive trivialization of the writ [causing] floods of stale, frivo-
lous and repititious petitions [to] inundate the dockets of the lower courts and swell our own," to
the possible prejudice of meritorious cases. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 536-37 (1952) (Jackson,
J., concurring).
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volved in a custody fight, the Court took advantage of the opportunity
to erect a jurisdictional barrier without having to rely on its analyses in
criminal cases.
IV. HOLDING OF THE LEHMAN COURT
The United States Supreme Court, in a six-three decision, affirmed
the circuit court's denial of federal habeas jurisdiction. The Court did
not reach the merits of Ms. Lehman's constitutional claims, but instead
stated that federal courts lack habeas corpus jurisdiction in such mat-
ters. 5 The majority opinion, written by Justice Powell, concluded, as
had the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that children of parents
whose parental rights have been involuntarily terminated are not in
state custody pursuant to a state court judgment.4 6 The Court also held
that "[flederalism concerns and the exceptional need for finality in
child-custody disputes argue strongly against the grant of Ms. Leh-
man's petition."'47
The dissenting opinion,4 8 written by Justice Blackmun, contended
that the custody requirement of the habeas corpus statute is "its most
flexible element."49 According to the dissent, comity concerns ex-
pressed by the majority were not "sufficient to erect ajurisdictional, as
opposed to a prudential, bar to federal habeas relief."50 The dissenting
members of the Court therefore would have allowed federal habeas
corpus collateral review of state proceedings involving involuntary ter-
mination of parental rights.5"
45. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3231, 3240. The Court left open the possibility that habeas corpus
might be available to minors in custody of some state institution pursuant to state action. Id at
3237 n. 12. However, even this possibility is questionable given the rationale underlying the Leh-
man majority's holding, as discussed infra at notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
46. 102 S. Ct. at 3235-38. In this connection, the Court noted that "habeas corpus is a major
exception to the doctrine of resjudicata." Id at 3238. The Court believed it particularly impor-
tant to be solicitous toward states in federal judicial determinations involving child custody mat-
ters. Id at 3238-40. The underlying assumption made by the Court that the state's interest is
exactly the same as the child's interest is examined in more detail infra at notes 79-82 and accom-
panying text.
47. 102 S. Ct. at 3238.
48. Id at 3240-45. Justice Blackmun's dissent was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
49. Id at 3241.
50. Id at 3242 (emphasis in original).
51. It probably is symptomatic of the difficulty of coping with family dysfunction through the
legal system that the Court, in Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982) (5-4 decision), man-
dated additional procedural safeguards at the state level for termination of parental rights. The
Court held in Santosky that a preponderance of evidence is not a sufficient standard of proof of
parental incapacity. Id at 1402-03. Apparently, the Santoksys were indigent, and this formed the
central reason for the state's termination of their parental rights. The Santosky Court stated, "In
parental rights terminations, the private interest affected is commanding." Id at 1396. Yet the
1983]
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A. The "In-Custody" Requirement
The first substantive issue addressed by the Court was whether a
state's termination of parental rights causes the children affected by the
proceeding to be in "state custody" for habeas corpus purposes. The
federal habeas corpus statute provides that a federal judge "shall enter-
tain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court ... ." As noted
above, the Lehman majority considered federalism concerns, the avoid-
ance of res judicata, and non-interference with the states' need for
finality as essential to its denial of habeas jurisdiction. However, it is
difficult to imagine how these concerns affect the definition of the word
"custody." The Court seems unable to separate the elements of its
analysis and deal with each element independently. This section will
deal with custody qua custody, and save concerns of federalism and
comity for later discussion. 3
There is a preliminary definitional difficulty in discussing the cus-
tody requirement in conjunction with Lehman: The word "custody"
carries too many connotations to allow for precise thought. There is
the "in custody" requirement of the habeas statute itself, and "custody"
in terms of control or guardianship over a child. Finally, there is the
"custody proceeding" or "custody battle," which, though closely tied to
the guardianship aspect has an entirely different emotional impact.
Neither the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit nor the Supreme
Court distinguishes these meanings. In order to avoid confusion, "cus-
tody" will be used here only in terms of the habeas corpus custody
requirement, unless otherwise indicated. The terms "guardianship"
Court took a different attitude in Lehman: "Ms. Lehman simply seeks to relitigate... the inter-
est in her own parental rights." Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3237. The Court appears to rationalize
constituti6nal decisions of broad application, in a difficult field, on the basis of its sense of how
deserving the parents are. In Santosky, the Court said "For the child, the consequences of termi-
nation of his natural parents' rights may well be far-reaching." Sanlosky, 102 S. Ct. at 1339 n.l 1.
In Lehman, the Court says that children whose parents' rights are terminated "certainly suffer no
restraint on liberty.. . and they suffer no [adequate] 'collateral consequences." Lehman, 102 S.
Ct. at 3237.1 52. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976) (emphasis added). The next phrase of the statute, "only on
the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States," id, defines the substantive challenges to state custody which may be brought under fed-
eral habeas corpus. By its terms, it excludes substantive challenges of a court's application of state
law or state constitution.
53. See infra notes 77-91 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 19:118
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and "control" will be used to denote the parent's or foster parent's con-
trol over a child.
The task of applying the modem custody requirement to situations
such as the one presented in Lehman is more complex than simply de-
fining the requirement. The broadening of the "in custody" interpreta-
tion has occurred only in the framework of adult proceedings. Minors
always are considered under the control of some adult or adults, and
thus are never as free as adults. Indeed, a failure of the appropriate
adult to maintain sufficient control over a minor may result in the state
stepping in to provide control.54 Many of the "collateral restraints"-
restraints not shared by the general public-noted by the Court in its
expansion of the custody requirement, are inapplicable to children."
In a pluralistic society that allows, and arguably encourages, a wide
variety of parenting styles, there probably is no particular restraint on a
child's liberty which is shared by children generally. In the absence of
a generally applicable definition of "freedom" for children, any at-
tempt to apply a test such as whether a state action "significantly re-
strain[s] [a child's] liberty to do those things which in this country free
[children] are entitled to do" 56 would be fruitless. An examination of
the custody question as applied to children must consider the unique
legal and social situation of children in our society. Reliance on the
meaning of custody as applied to adults can only be by analogy.
Thus, the primary question which the Lehman Court should have
addressed in determining whether the Lehman boys were "in custody
pursuant to the judgment of the State court"57 was the effect that the
termination of parental rights had on the children. The relevant por-
tions of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act follow:
Effect of decree of termination ....
(b) Award of custody.-The decree shall award custody
of the child to the agency or the person consenting to accept
custody under Section 2501 (relating to relinquishment to
agency) or Section 2502 (relating to relinquishment to adult
54. See, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (Purdon 1982) (definition of "dependent child"
includes "one without proper parental care or control. . ."), and id § 6351 (disposition of delin-
quent child).
55. Minors, since they cannot vote, cannot be disenfranchised. In addition, they normally
are not free to change their residence or, frequently, to leave the locality without someone's per-
mission, usually that of a parent. If minors such as the Lehman boys are in state custody, their
disabilities are not identical to those suffered by adults who are in state custody.
56. As revised by the author, this is the test formulated by the Court in Jones v. Cunningham,
371 U.S. 236, 243 (1962), for adults.
57. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976).
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intending to adopt child) or the petitioner in the case of a pro-
ceeding under Section 2512 (relating to petition for involun-
tary termination).
(c) Authority of agency or person receiving custody.-
An agency or person receiving custody of a child shall...
have the authority, inter alia, to consent to marriage, to enlist-
ment in the armed forces and to major medical, psychiatric
and surgical treatment and to exercise such other authority
concerning the child as a natural parent could exercise.58
The decree terminating Ms. Lehman's parental rights awarded
control of her sons to their respective foster families, who were also the
prospective adoptive parents.5 9 Thus, although an involuntary termi-
nation of parental rights "is not a custody proceeding," 60 there is
clearly a "control" aspect to the judgment, in that the court is required
to give control to some person or agency.
The section of the Pennsylvania Adoption Act challenged by Ms.
Lehman 6 '-the statute permitting termination of parental rights-does
not provide for the disposition of a child after his parents' rights to
raise him have been terminated. Therefore it is impossible to deter-
mine whether the state itself, merely by invoking the statute, places
upon a child restraints "not shared by the public generally. . . suffi-
cient. . . to support the issuance of habeas corpus."62
There is no analysis by the Lehman majority of how the state be-
comes the champion of the minor's well-being in parental rights termi-
nations, and thus should be free of federal interference. One can only
surmise that basic value judgments underlie this outcome. However,
the fact that values are not explained in the opinion suggests that the
Court never explicitly considered its underlying value system in reach-
ing its conclusion. It is thus entirely possible that the Court's own
unexamined compassion for a vaguely imagined group of deprived
children allowed it to couch its opinion in more absolute terms than
were necessary or desirable.
Because the termination of parental rights is but a prelude to an
58. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2521 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
59. In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, -, 383 A.2d 1228, 1239-40, cert. denied 439 U.S. 880
(1978).
60. Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3237, n.13 (quoting statement by Ms. Lehman's attorney in the
original termination proceedings).
61. 23 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 2511 (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). See supra note 17 for the
pertinent text of the statute.
62. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 240.
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adoption proceeding, the law controlling adoptions might contain clues
relevant to determining the effect of termination proceedings on the
child. Pennsylvania law requires the court to determine, before decree-
ing adoption, whether the facts stated in the petition for adoption are
true,63 and whether "the needs and welfare of the person proposed to
be adopted will.be promoted."'  The consent of a child under twelve
years old is not necessary.65 In addition, if the court dismisses the peti-
tion for adoption, it is required to "enter an appropriate order in regard
to the custody of the child."66 Presumably this could include place-
ment in another foster home or with a state agency." Granting that
children generally will be under some entity's control, it seems that
these incidents of a termination proceeding may amount to "severe re-
straints on individual liberty"68 sufficient to warrant the grant of a
habeas writ.
In this context, comparing the degree of control by the state over
the affected childrens' disposition with the restraints involved in the
conditions of parole in Jones v. Cunningham69 is instructive. In Jones,
the Court found the restraints placed on a parolee sufficient to consti-
tute state custody: The parole could be revoked or modified at any
time; the parolee could be returned to prison at any time for cause; a
parole officer's permission was required to leave the community,
change residence, or own or operate a motor vehicle; and the parolee
was required to make monthly reports to the parole officer.70 Admit-
tedly, the incarceration provisions necessarily involved in the Jones'
parolee's status find no corollaries in the Lehman boys' situation.
However, the details of the guardianship over the boys are subject to
change,7" paralleling the possibility of revocation or modification of pa-
role in Jones. Moreover, while children are never free to change their
residence without permission, the Lehman boys became subject to in-
voluntarily having where they resided, and even with whom they re-
63. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2902(a) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
64. Id
65. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 271 1(a)(1) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984).
66. Id. § 2902(b).
67. The child would be without a parent or guardian and thus would be a dependent child,
under 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6302 (Purdon 1982). His disposition would be governed by id.
§ 6351, which permits placement with an individual, private agency, or public agency.
68. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. at 243.
69. 371 U.S. 236 (1962). The Jones facts are described supra in the text accompanying notes
32-34.
70. Id at 237.
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sided, changed at the will of the state by means of court proceedings. 2
This would be their status until a petition for adoption was accepted
and a decree of adoption issued, thus paralleling the need for a parole
officer's permission to leave the community or change residence. In-
deed, because the state could make these changes on its own initiative,
the degree of control over the Lehman boys seems even greater than
that exercised over the parolee in Jones. Comparing the constraints on
a child after parental rights termination with the disabilities suffered by
the parolee in Jones reveals that such children are under unusual con-
straints, which are controlled by the state. These constraints are suffi-
ciently parallel to those in Jones that such children should be
considered in state custody under modem custody analysis.
The Lehman Court reserved judgment on whether federal habeas
corpus might be available to minors placed in a custodial facility pur-
suant to state action.7" However, the logic of the Court's opinion seems
to preclude habeas even in this situation. The problem, under the
Court's reasoning, lies in the state custody requirement. The minor is
placed pursuant to an adjudication addressed to him rather than to his
parent, as in a parental rights termination. Instead of being adjudged
"guilty," minors generally are adjudged "delinquent."'74 They are then
placed in a facility, if the court deems this necessary. However, there
usually are no time limits placed on the juvenile's stay in an institution,
as in an adult's criminal sentencing." Instead, the minor is institution-
alized until he is rehabilitated or reaches majority.7 6 Although superfi-
cially this looks like incarceration, any child's parents also could place
him in a military school, or other institution, regardless of state in-
volvement. Thus, a minor whose basic freedom is taken away by the
state is not necessarily subject to any restraints not shared by minors
generally.
Again, the bottom line is that minors always are subject to external
control. Any minor could, at least theoretically, be subjected to re-
straints similar to those imposed by a state when it institutionalizes a
72. Id
73. 102 S. Ct. at 3237 n.12.
74. See 47 AM. JUR. 2d Juvenile Courts and Delinquent and Dependent Children § 23 (1969)
("Juvenile delinquency has, in some decisions, been described as a child's conduct which would be
considered a crime if he were an adult.")
75. See id § 33 at 1011 ("[I]t has been held that a delinquent child is to be detained while
under age until reformed .... [To commit a juvenile for a definite period would rest on an
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minor. Therefore, following the Lehman Court's logic, federal habeas
corpus would not be available to a minor "incarcerated" pursuant to
juvenile proceedings, no matter how egregious the violation of his fed-
eral rights.
From the foregoing, it appears that application of the custody re-
quirement, in consonance with both the history of habeas corpus and
recent American developments in the area, permits, and perhaps re-
quires, a finding that the Lehman boys were "in custody" for habeas
purposes.
B. Federalism Concerns
The second area of substantive concern addressed by the Court
involves the effect that federal habeas corpus might have on federalism
and comity between state and federal courts in Lehman -type situations.
The majority took the position that the state's interest in the welfare of
minors, and thus in parental rights terminations, outweighs the federal
interest in the individual liberty of the minors involved." Because of
this supremacy of state interests, the Court held that federal habeas
corpus could not be available as a means of review of state termination
proceedings: "The federal writ of habeas corpus . . . should be re-
served for those instances in which the federal interest in individual
liberty is so strong that it outweighs federalism and finality concerns.
78
Although the Supreme Court's deference to states because of fed-
eralism concerns is not new, 79 the balancing approach used by the
Court in this instance to accommodate federalism interests is too sim-
plistic. The state's interest is identified as an "exceptional need for
finality," 80 while "[the sole federal interest is in constitutional issues
collateral to such disputes."'" The state's finality interest is then
equated with the children's need for "secure, stable, long-term, contin-
77. 102 S. Ct. at 3239-40.
78. Id at 3240. This is the only explicit statement made by the Court revealing that it consid-
ers a balancing approach to be appropriate. The opinion discusses the state interest in finality and
federalism, id. at 3238-39, then veers into a discussion of historical cases cited by Ms. Lehman in
support of her habeas corpus petition, id. at 3239-40. Finally, the Court mentions the federal
interests in individual liberty, id. Thus, the Court begins balancing, then attempts to explain why
it is balancing by distinguishing the Lehman case from prior federal habeas cases, and then cur-
sorily finishes balancing. This may indicate confusion by the majority as to exactly what it is
doing.
79. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
80. 102 S. Ct. at 3238.
81. Id at 3239 (quoting Sylvander v. New England Home for Little Wanderers, 584 F.2d
1103, 1111 (1st Cir. 1978)). These "collateral constitutional issues" are equated, via the Court's
language, to the federal interest in individual liberty, which the Court finds outweighed by the
1983]
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uous relationships" with a parent figure.82 Thus, according to the
Court, the state's interest is the same as the child's interest.
In cutting off a possible federal forum for litigating individual lib-
erty issues involved in a state's termination of parental rights, the Court
almost certainly has contributed to a quicker adoption process, in cases
in which the natural parent objects, by reducing pre-adoption litigation
time. This, in turn, should increase the stability of the child's relation-
ship with his immediate parent figures. He will know he is going to
stay in one family. However, stability is not the only interest of the
child which is involved and which needs protection in termination pro-
ceedings. The child's liberty interest, and whatever interest he may
have in a continuing relationship with his natural parent,8 3 are com-
pletely ignored. In a pluralistic society, the legitimate state interest in
what it perceives to be the child's welfare must be balanced against the
parent's interest in raising a child as he sees fit-that is, against the
parent's perception of the child's welfare.8 4
The Lehman Court's balancing approach ties the state's interest
with the emotion-laden interest in children's welfare and discounts the
,individual liberty interests involved. The Court held that state deter-
minations deserve such great deference in parental rights terminations
that federal habeas corpus might never be available to test violations of
federal rights in such proceedings.
As noted in Mr. Justice Blackmun's dissent in Lehman, habeas
corpus proceedings contain built-in mechanisms to protect federalism
concerns, making a jurisdictional bar to habeas corpus unnecessary. 5
The dissent focuses on federal courts' discretion to refuse to issue the
writ. 6 In addition, the exhaustion requirement of the federal habeas
corpus statute8 7 affords some protection of state's rights.
The exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254 mandates that
need for finality, see 102 S. Ct. at 3239-40. This view relegates individual liberty interests to a
collateral position in American constitutional law. Surely, this is a novel approach.
82. 102 S. Ct. at 3238-39.
83. See Davis v. Page, 640 F.2d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1981), vacatedmem. ,sub. nom. Chastain v.
Davis, 102 S. Ct. 3504 (1982). The Davis case, which the Supreme Court vacated and remanded
"for further consideration in light of' the Lehman decision, is discussed supra note 20.
84. See Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388 (1982), which makes clear the Court's position
that it is a violation of a parent's constitutional rights for the state to terminate parental rights
because others are perceived to be more fit to raise the child. Santosky is discussed further supra
note 51.
85. See 102 S. Ct. at 3240-45 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. Id
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
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persons seeking federal habeas relief fully exhaust every state rem-
edy;88 thus, the statute itself provides, to a large extent, the protection
of states' interests which the Lehman Court sought. The state is given a
full opportunity to explore the facts and issues, and to address any con-
stitutional or other federal claims. If resort to the state supreme court is
available, that court must have an opportunity to deal with the case.
Then, if there is a genuine federal question involved, a federal court
may grant a writ of habeas corpus.8 9 The state has the first chance to
attempt to adequately protect the affected individual, but if the state's
efforts fail or are defective, there is a potential federal remedy. The
requirement of exhaustion helps to assure that the state's own processes
will not be subverted by federal action.
An additional protection afforded to federalism concerns is the
substantial degree of discretion on the part of federal courts: They may
decline to assert their habeas jurisdiction if they deem it proper.90 The
federal interest in allowing states the freedom to embark or not to em-
bark on both experiments may come into play. The Lehman Court
could have used its balancing approach and determined that habeas
corpus should not be extended in this case as a matter of discretion.
This would have allowed the Court to reach the same conclusion in
barring habeas corpus for the Lehman children without erecting a ju-
risdictional bar to future petitions.9 Perhaps the Court simply over-
stepped itself in holding that federal habeas is never appropriate
following a state's involuntary termination of a parent's rights.
C. Standing
A final substantive concern, not addressed by the majority but dis-
88. Id. § 2254(b) states: "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the
applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State .... "
89. Id. § 2254(a) allows the grant of habeas corpus to a person in state custody "only on the
ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United
States."
90. See Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 539 (1976), wherein the Court stated: "[I]n some
circumstances considerations of comity and concerns for the orderly administration of criminal
justice require a federal court to forgo the exercise of its habeas corpus power."
91. The majority seems implicitly concerned about abuse ofjudicial discretion by judges who
might feel that the federal liberty interest would always outweigh the state's interest in finality.
See 102 S. Ct. at 3238 & n.15. Social consciousness seems historically to ebb and flow, and the
Court appears to believe that there recently has been too much flow among federal judges. There
may be empirical reasons for such concern, but this seems an insubstantial reason for the Court to
stem the tide completely. Establishing a clear precedent against allowing habeas corpus to minors,
in order to cut off potential abuses of discretion, also robs the judicial system of the flexibility
which may be necessary to its survival.
1983]
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cussed by the dissent92 and several of the opinions below, 93 is whether
Ms. Lehman had standing to assert a habeas corpus claim as next
friend on behalf of her sons. Although in some circumstances a peti-
tion for habeas corpus may be filed by a next friend,94 courts have been
relatively reluctant to allow next friend application. This reluctance
has been explained on the ground that the writ of habeas corpus was
not intended to "be availed of, as a matter of course, by intruders or
uninvited meddlers, styling themselves next friends." 95
In Weber v. Garza9 6 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit set
out three guidelines for testing whether a next friend application
should be heard:
First. . . (1) why the detained person did not sign and verify
the petition and (2) the relationship and interest of the would-
be "next friend." Second, individuals not licensed to practice
law by the state may not use the "next friend" device as an
artifice for the unauthorized practice of law. . . . Third,
when the application for habeas corpus fied by a would be
"next friend" does not set forth an adequate reason or expla-
nation of the necessity for resort to the "next friend" device,
the court is without jurisdiction to consider the petition.97
"Adequate reason" for filing by a next friend has been found where, for
example, the detainee is inaccessible, cannot understand the English
language, or is mentally incompetent. 98 Infancy also has been recog-
nized as a sufficient incapacity to allow for a next friend habeas
petition.99
A simple finding of incapacity, coupled with some reasonable rela-
tionship between the would-be next friend and the detainee is not suffi-
cient to support a next friend petition."° Instead, a higher standard
has been established, permitting next friend status to be "conferred on
those who act for another as that other would do but for an intervening
92. 102 S. Ct. at 3244 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
93. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Services Agency, 648 F.2d 135, 151 (3d Cir.
1981) (opinion of Adams, J.); 648 F.2d at 173 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
94. "Application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed and verified by the
person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf." 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (1976)
(emphasis added).
95. Wilson v. Dixon, 256 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1958).
96. 570 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1978).
97. Id at 513-14.
98. These instances of "next friend" applicability are cited in United States ex rel Bryant v.
Houston, 273 F. 915, 916 (2d Cir. 1921).
99. United States ex ret Funaro v. Watchom, 164 F. 152, 153 (2d Cir. 1908).
100. Evans v. Bennett, 467 F. Supp. 1108, 1111 (S.D. Ala. 1979).
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incapacity."' A particularly striking example of this kind of problem
was found in Gilmore v. Utah,"°2 in which the Court terminated a stay
of execution for convicted murderer Gary Gilmore. Chief Justice Bur-
ger, concurring, noted that Gilmore had never wanted the stay of exe-
cution. For this reason, he felt that Gilmore's mother could not act as a
next friend in applying for the stay.103
It becomes more difficult to discern whether a next friend applica-
tion is acceptable when the individual being detained is a minor. Mi-
nors generally are considered legally incompetent, so it is arguable that
no statement by a minor as to his own wishes should be given any
weight. This, of course, goes against both common sense and actual
practice. It is clear that the Pennsylvania orphan's court carefully con-
sidered testimony in chambers by Ms. Lehman's sons to the effect that
they did not wish to return to live with their mother.104 However, it is
possible to imagine situations in which a court should ignore, or accord
less weight to, the statements of a minor as to his preferred disposition
of a situation.'0 5 Justice Brennan's characterization of this in Lehman
as a "difficult discretionary questio 1 ° 6l seems particularly apt. There
seems to be no hard and fast rule which would adequately cover the
vast field of possible factual situations, and a court would have to
weigh carefully all relevant factors. It seems unlikely that next friend
status should be accorded to a parent of a relatively old child who
clearly expresses a desire that the habeas corpus proceedings be
discontinued.17
VI. THE INFLUENCE OF LEHMAN
Generally, a state's action in terminating parental rights or making
other disposition of a minor probably is in the minor's best interest and
is not an undue imposition on parental rights. States generally accord
great deference to parents' decisions concerning how to raise their chil-
dren, both as a policy matter and pursuant to constitutional restric-
101. Id
102. 429 U.S. 1012 (1976).
103. Id at 1013-14 (Burger, CJ., concurring).
104. See In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, -, 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (1978).
105. For example, a very young child might be considered incapable of making an enlight-
ened decision. Also, a child whose behavior problems are causing temporary friction with a par-
ent might say that he wished never to return home, just to avoid dealing with the conflict.
106. 102 S. Ct. at 3244.
107. Even so, it does not seem necessary to completely foreclose next friend status to such a
parent. The broad range of fact patterns which might arise dictates against rashly formulating any
absolute rule in this area.
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tions. °8 The basic question thus becomes whether the holding in
Lehman will prevent appropriate action, and possibly prevent ultimate
justice, in those rare cases where a parent and child have been deprived
of their legal relationship in violation of their rights.
Clearly, the Lehman majority believes adequate remedies exist
outside the habeas corpus route. The Court adopted the following
statement by the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Sylvander v.
New EnglandHomefor Little Wanderers: 9 "At bottom the question is
whether these constitutional issues can be adequately raised through
the usual channels-appeal, certiorari and the civil rights statutes--or
whether the vehicle of federal habeas, with its unique features, is
required."'10
Direct appeal from a decision of the highest court in a state to the
United States Supreme Court is possible where the validity of a statute
of any state is challenged as being repugnant to the Constitution, trea-
ties, or laws of the United States, and the state court's decision upholds
the statute's validity."' Thus, in a constitutional challenge to a state
statute, such as Ms. Lehman's challenge" 2 of the Pennsylvania Adop-
tion Act, there is a right of direct appeal to the United States Supreme
Court. However, the Court need not grant plenary review, and may
summarily affirm." 3 In addition, on appeal the Supreme Court gener-
ally is bound by the state court's findings of fact."l 4  On a writ of
habeas corpus, however, it is possible in limited circumstances for fact
questions to be reopened. 15 This is a potentially invaluable tool for
doing justice in an appropriate case. Because reconsideration of find-
ings of fact is foreclosed on direct appeal to the Supreme Court, direct
appeal may be inferior to habeas corpus as a way to undo an unjust
108. Most, if not all states have a statutory goal to "preserve family unity whenever possible,"
such as that found in 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6301(b) (Purdon Supp. 1983-1984). In addition,
the United States Supreme Court, in decisions such as Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923),
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), has placed constitutional limits on state
interference with parent-child relationships.
109. 584 F.2d 1103 (1st Cir. 1978).
110. 102 S. Ct. at 3239-40 (quoting Sylvander, 584 F.2d at 1111).
111. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2) (1976).
112. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
113. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 343-44 (1975).
114. See Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 50 (1949); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 196,
rehk' denied, 364 U.S. 856 (1960).
115. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976). The statute provides that a state court's "determination
of a factual issue.. . shall be presumed to be correct" unless the habeas applicant can estab-
lish (or the respondent in the action admits) any of the following set of circumstances:
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termination of parental rights, if the state court has made inappropriate
findings based on the evidence presented.
The Lehman majority also pointed to civil rights statutes as an-
other means of protecting parents' and children's rights in termination
proceedings."t 6 There is a potential right of action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 19831" for a "deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution""' 8 if it occurs "under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State.""19 This right,
however, also is inferior in some respects to federal habeas as a means
of protecting federal rights. Federal appeals courts have construed the
doctrine of res judicata to cut off civil rights claims on federal statutes
following a state supreme court's judgment based on the same basic
facts, and reaching the same issues, as the action filed in federal
court.120  These decisions would give full credit to the state court's
(1) that the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the State court hear-
ing;
(2) that the factfinding procedure employed by the State court was not adequate to
afford a full and fair hearing;
(3) that the material facts were not adequately developed at the State court hear-
ing;
(4) that the State court lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter or over the person
of the applicant in the State court proceeding;
(5) that the applicant was an indigent and the State court, in deprivation of his
constitutional right, failed to appoint counsel to represent him in the State court proceed-
ing;
(6) that the applicant did not receive a full, fair, and adequate hearing in the State
court proceeding; or
(7) that the applicant was otherwise denied due process of law in the State court
proceeding;
(8) or unless that part of the record of the State court proceeding in which the
determination of such factual issue, was made, pertinent to a determination of the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support such factual determination, is produced as provided for
hereinafter, and the Federal court on a consideration of such part of the record as a
whole concludes that such factual determination is not fairly supported by the
record ...
Id
116. See 102 S. Ct. at 3239-40 (quoting Sylvander, 584 F.2d at I111).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
118. Id
119. Id
120. See, e.g., Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 363-64 (9th Cir. 1977) (American Indian's
allegations, pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8), of violation of his civil rights in divorce action held
foreclosed by the res judicata effect of the state courts determination); Spence v. Latting, 512 F.2d
93, 97-99 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 896 (1975) (police officer's claim under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, of lack of due process in his firing held foreclosed by res judicata effect of state supreme
court determination that state law did not require an additional hearing); Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d
96, 98-99 (3d Cir. 1973) (suspended city councilmen's claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, of lack of due
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judgment,' 2' holding the federal suit to be tantamount to relitigation of
the same issues between the same parties and therefore precluded.'22
Thus, contrary to the assumption of the Lehman Court, a civil rights
action might be unavailable to a parent in Ms. Lehman's position if the
action was deemed a mere "relitigation" of the same issues which were
presented, or which might have been presented, at the state level.
A federal court also might give a more limited, collateral-estoppel
effect to state judgments, 12 holding that only issues which were actu-
ally raised and fully and fairly pressed before the state courts are bind-
ing upon the federal courts. 124 The litigant may, however, be required
to expressly reserve his federal questions in order to preserve his right
of action.'25 It also has been held that the litigant must have attempted
previously to bring the action before a federal court that declined juris-
diction on grounds that questions more properly raised before a state
court possibly were dispositive of the case.' 26 Thus, a civil rights action
could present a slippery procedural situation, and even be impossible
in some situations. In addition, the action could prolong proceedings
by requiring full litigation of state questions in the state court, followed
by litigation of rserved federal questions in the federal court system.
It is exactly this kind of interminable proceeding which the Lehman
Court supposedly was trying to eliminate by denying federal habeas to
nonincarcerated minors. 127
Finally, the writ of certiorari directly to the Supreme Court is an
inadequate remedy. The Court simply lacks the time and personnel to
consider every case which might have merit. Federal habeas, on the
121. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976) provides in pertinent part that "judicial proceedings. . . shall
have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States... as they have. . . in
such State . . . from which they are taken."
122. See Spence, 512 F.2d at 98, wherein the Court states: "Where a second suit between the
same parties or their privies is on the same cause of action, the final judgment in the prior action is
conclusive as to all matters which were actually litigated, as well as those which could have been
litigated."
123. See, e.g., New Jersey Educ. Ass'n v. Burke, 579 F.2d 769, 772-76 (3d Cir. 1978) (remand-
ing action for stay of a board of education order, to determine whether due process and equal
protection claims were fully litigated before the state court); Kurek v. Pleasure Driveway & Park
Dist., 557 F.2d 580, 594-95 (7th Cir. 1977) (section 1983 claims based on violations of civil rights
allowed despite adverse state determination, based on other issues, arising under the same facts).
124. This interpretation is illustrated by the following statement from Burke: "[A] state court
judgment forecloses a [civil rights] litigant from raising grievances in federal court only if such
claims have been pressed before, and decided by, a state tribunal." 579 F.2d at 774.
125. See Lovely v. Laliberte, 498 F.2d 1261, 1263-64 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1038
(1974).
126. See Roy v. Jones, 484 F.2d 96, 101 (3d Cir. 1973).
127. See Lehman, 102 S. Ct. at 3239.
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other hand, could be granted by a district court'28 with right of appeal
only to a circuit court.' 29 The result would be that the Supreme Court
could not be bogged down with such cases, and an adequate remedy
would remain available to parents or minors affected by state termina-
tion proceedings.
Thus, contrary to the rationalizations of the Lehman Court, fed-
eral habeas is sometimes superior to any other possible remedy in the
federal courts. In addition, allowing federal habeas for minors who are
in custody pursuant to a state court judgment would be more consistent
with the historically broad construction of circumstances under which
the writ has been deemed available. 30
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Lehman is to some extent consis-
tent with its recent tendency to restrict the availability of habeas corpus
for state prisoners. It is perhaps in this light that the decision is most
readily understood and explained.
However, it also seems that the relatively clear and compelling fact
situation involved in Lehman buffered the potentially expansive nature
of the Court's holding. The Court appears to have completely cut off
federal habeas for minors, with the possible exception of minors incar-
cerated pursuant to state judgments. Of course, it is possible that the
holding will be construed restrictively as applicable only to the facts
presented in the case, i.e., that federal habeas corpus is not available to
challenge a state's involuntary termination of parental rights where the
children appear to be competent to decide that they do not wish to
return to the parent seeking the habeas action. Yet the Court's lan-
guage does not imply such a restrictive view, and as long as the holding
stands unrestricted it is unlikely that a habeas petition for an incarcer-
ated minor will be permitted by the federal courts, no matter how com-
pelling the facts. The Court would have been wiser to have disposed of
the petition on a narrow ground, such as Ms. Lehman's standing to sue
on behalf of her sons. This would certainly have been more historically
consistent. It also would have, perhaps, been more consistent with the
Court's view that habeas corpus is the sole federal remedy available to
128. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1976).
129. See id § 2253.
130. See infra notes 24-44 and accompanying text.
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challenge either the fact, or duration, of state custody.13 1
James Andreasen
131. See Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973) ("[Wlhen a state prisoner is challeng-
ing the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment and the relief he seeks is a determina-
tion that he is entitled to immediate release . . . his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas
corpus.")
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